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SECURITIES LAW
BROKER HELD LIABLE FOR RECKLESSLY AIDING AND ABETTING A
VIOLATION OF RULE 10b-5
Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.
Section 10(b)l of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule
10b-51 promulgated thereunder prohibit fraudulent conduct in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities.3 While it is now
clear that these provisions give rise to an implied private cause of
action for damages against an individual primarily responsible for
the fraud,' it is somewhat less settled whether aiders and abettorss
Section 10(b) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... (b) To use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... , any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
2 Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
For a general discussion of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see 3 A. BROMBERG, SEcURrrIxa LAw:
FRAUD chs. 9, 10 (1977); 6 L. Loss, SEcuRrrizs REGULATION'ch. 9 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Loss].
An implied private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 was first recognized in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Subsequently, the Supreme Court
and a number of courts of appeals also concluded that an action could be pursued under Rule
10b-5. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Christ
v. Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963); Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th
Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1960); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Beury v. Beury,
222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
Despite the Supreme Court's increasingly restrictive approach to damage remedies under the
securities laws, see TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
752 n.15 (1975), its most recent decision on Rule 10b-5 indicates that it will continue to
recognize the need for a private cause of action to promote the purposes of § 10(b). See Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Furthermore, the federal courts have continued
to expand the availability of private damages under other provisions of the securities laws.
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may be held liable.' Even more controversy surrounds the issue of
what degree of mental culpability must be established before a de-
fendant may be held liable for damages under section 10(b) and
Rule l0b.5. 7 The debate over these issues was intensified by the
See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (0 14(a) of the 1934 Act); Abrahamson
v. Fleischner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (§ 206 of the
Investment Advisors Act of 1940); Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 994 (1971) (Investment Companies Act).
3 In addition to aiding and abetting, secondary liability under Rule 10b-5 may be im-
posed for participating in a conspiracy on theories of respondeat superior or "controlling
persons." Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
4 Aiding and abetting liability under the securities laws had been widely recognized in
the federal courts. See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 960 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), affl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). It is interesting to note that, at the same time
the courts were formulating a private cause of action for aiding and abetting under Rule 10b-
5, Congress was also moving toward the position of secondary liability for damages. In 1960,
the Senate passed several amendments to § 10(b) creating a cause of action for aiding and
abetting. S. 3769, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); see 1 Loss, note 3 supra, at 205-06 n.80. The
House, however, never acted on these measures. 106 CONG. REc. 17, 125-29 (daily ed. Aug. 3,
1960). Despite rejection of these amendments, the courts refused to find that Congress in-
tended to exempt aiders and abettors from liability. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 678 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), however,
the Supreme Court expressly declined to "consider whether civil liability for aiding and
abetting is appropriate under . . . [§ 10(b)] and . . . Rule [10b-5]." Id. at 191 n.7. Never-
theless, the lower federal courts and the commentators have had little difficulty in concluding
that liability extends to aiders and abettors. See, e.g., Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759
(2d Cir. 1977); S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEA.mls AND SEcurrIEs MAiKS ch. 9.03 (1977); Ruder,
Secondary Liability Under the Securities Acts, in EioHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURrrES
REGULATION 353 (1978); Comment, Rule 10b-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 999 (1976); Note, The Private Action Against a
Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor: Silent and Inactive Conduct, 29 VAND. L. REv. 1233
(1976); 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937 (1976). The Second Circuit has observed that the elimina-
tion of secondary liability would cut away the heart of § 10(b) and protect those who play an
indispensable part in the fraud. SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1046
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
7 In the early 10b-5 cases, the federal courts were divided on the question whether
scienter is a necessary element in a private damages suit. Compare Fischman v. Raytheon
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951) (requiring "the ingredient of fraud"), and
Howard v. Furst, 140 F. Supp. 507, 512 n.17 (S.D.N.Y.), affl'd, 238 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957) ("willful misconduct"), with Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d
634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (negligence) (dicta), and Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961)
(no scienter required). By 1976, at least three circuits were willing to rest liability on negli-
gence while five circuits required, or suggested that they might require, some form of scien-
ter. Compare Carras v. Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1975), Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351,
1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d
402, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976), Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,
489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), and Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), with Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100
1979]
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Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,8 which
established a "scienter" requirement for private damage actions,
but reserved for future consideration whether scienter encompasses
recklessness and whether liability may be imposed for aiding and
abetting a violation of the securities laws.' Both issues were ad-
dressed in Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co.,' 0 in which the Sec-
ond Circuit held a broker liable for aiding and abetting a securities
fraud although he had no actual knowledge of the illegal scheme and
indicated that the reckless breach of fiduciary duty may serve as a
substitute for actual knowledge."
The plaintiff in Rolf was an investor who had retained Akiyoshi
Yamada, a dynamic young investment advisor, to manage his sizea-
ble stock portfolio.12 Yamada was given full trading discretion with
the understanding that he would be supervised by Michael Stott, a
registered representative of Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co. (BEDCO),
(7th Cir. 1974), rev 'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974),
Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1239 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970), and
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) (dictum). In Clegg, Smallwood
and Lanza, scienter was defined to include recklessness. See 507 F.2d at 1061; 489 F.2d at
606; 479 F.2d at 1306.
- 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
1 Id. at 191-92 n.7, 193 & n.12. Relying heavily on the language of § 10(b), the Hochfelder
Court concluded that the words "manipulative or deceptive" and "device or contrivance"
indicated a legislative intention to limit liability to intentional or willful conduct. Id. at 193.
The scope of the scienter requirement enunciated in Hochfelder has been the subject of much
controversy.
It has been suggested that there are five levels of conduct relating to state of mind:
1. Deliberate conduct exists when the defendant has an intent to injure others.
2. Knowing conduct exists when the defendant acts with the knowledge that his
acts may injure others. Knowing conduct would include knowing misrepresentation
or nondisclosure.
3. Reckless conduct exists when the defendant acts in conscious disregard of, or
indifference to, the risk that others will be misled. This conduct includes what is
sometimes referred to as "gross negligence."
4. Negligent conduct exists when the defendant acts unreasonably but does not
act with conscious disregard of consequences.
5. Innocent conduct exists when the defendant cannot reasonably be expected to
know the true facts.
Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of Culpability Necessary for Violation of the Federal
Securities Laws in Information Transmission Cases, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 571, 575 (1975).
While the Hochfelder decision clearly excludes negligent and innocent conduct as bases for a
private cause of action, see 425 U.S. at 214, it is unclear whether negligence is sufficient in
an SEC enforcement action. See 425 U.S. at 194 n.12. Compare SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,
1333 (5th Cir. 1978) (scienter required), with SEC v. Aaron, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 14, 1979, at 3,
col. 2 (negligence).
l- 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3391 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1978), aff'g in part
and rev'g in part 424 F. Supp. 1021 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
570 F.2d at 44-48.
" Id. at 41.
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which had maintained Rolf's account for a number of years.' 3 Al-
most from the outset, Stott assumed a "hand-holding" posture,
repeatedly assuring Rolf of Yamada's competence.' 4 When Rolf
began to complain about the continued decline in value of his port-
folio, Stott took the position that he was merely an "order taker"
and not responsible for the management of the portfolio.' 5 During
most of the period of Yamada's management Stott was in daily
contact with Yamada and was aware of most of the transactions
conducted on Rolf's behalf.6 Although he personally believed the
securities selected by Yamada were "junk," Stott never communi-
cated his belief to Rolf.17 During the period of Yamada's manage-
ment the value and quality of Rolf's portfolio declined dramati-
cally.' 8 Rolf commenced an action against Stott and BEDCO alleg-
ing various violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.'1 The district
court found that Yamada had utilized his power over Rolf's account
to engage in fraudulent stock manipulations and held that, by
breaching his duty to investigate, Stott had aided and abetted Ya-
mada's fraudulent activities."0
13 Id. In 1963, Rolf had entrusted a discretionary account to one of BEDCO's senior
partners. When the partner retired in 1969, Rolf attempted to duplicate his skills by combin-
ing Yamada's bold investment techniques with Stott's reliability. Id. at 41-42. Rolf's stated
goal was to maintain "substantial capital gain in an investment program emphasizing preser-
vation and augmentation of capital." Id. at 42.
"Id. at 43.
"Id. at 42.
I Id. In addition to making several "buy" recommendations, Stott executed the trades
ordered by Yamada. Id. at 42-43.
7Id. at 43.
" Id. In May 1969, when Yamada was retained, Rolf's portfolio consisted of high quality
stocks and warrants worth $1,423,000. Id. at 42. By January 1970, the portfolio had been
completely liquidated, 14 of the 20 issues having been sold at a loss. Id. These securities were
replaced with 41 issues of substantially lower quality, including a restricted security. Id. By
October 1970, the value of Rolf's portfolio had declined to $446,000. Id. at 53.
19 424 F. Supp. at 1022.
20 Id. at 1038-39, 1043. The district court also held BEDCO liable under a respondeat
superior theory, which has been held to apply to SEC enforcement actions against brokerage
firms. Id. at 1044 (citing SEC v. Geon Irdus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v.
Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975)). In the alternative, the district
court found that BEDCO was liable for the actions of Stott, itsemployee, under § 20 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). Section 20 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) Every person who, directly or indirectly controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or a cause of action.
Id. For a discussion of the relationship between § 20 and the common law respondeat superior
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On appeal, 2' the Second Circuit initially concluded that dam-
ages are recoverable against a defendant who aids and abets a viola-
tion of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 22 Judge Oakes, who authored
the majority opinion, 23 then turned to the question whether Stott
could be held liable under the scienter standard established in Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder.24 Reasoning that the Supreme Court in-
tended to eliminate wholly faultless and good faith conduct as a
basis for liability, Judge Oakes concluded that the Second Circuit's
traditional view that scienter encompasses recklessness need not be
modified. 25 Moreover, the court observed, a more exacting require-
doctrine, see Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1017, 1028-34 (1973).
The district court also held that Stott had violated New York Stock Exchange Rule 405,
see 2 N.Y.S.E. (CCH) 1 2405, and article III of the Rules of Fair Practice of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 424 F. Supp. at 1041. NYSE Rule 405 requires
"[e]very member organization . . . to (1) [u]se due diligence to learn the essential facts
relative to every . . . account accepted . . . [and to] (2) Islupervise diligently all accounts
handled by registered representatives of the organization." NYSE Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. GumE
(CCH) T 2405. Similarly, NASD Rule of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, requires members to make
investment recommendations to customers only upon "reasonable grounds for believing that
the recommendation is suitable." Noting that the NYSE and NASD rules are designed to
protect investors, the district court found them "sufficiently precise to sustain a [private]
cause of action" and create duties unknown at common law. 424 F. Supp. 1041. This determi-
nation was not reviewed on appeal. 570 F.2d at 48 n.19.
Finally, the district court rejected Rolf's request that damages be measured by net
trading losses, holding that damages were to be measured instead according to a "churning"
theory, which requires repayment of all commissions and interest thereon. 424 F. Supp. at
1044-45. The court reasoned that any other measure would be too speculative since market
factors, unrelated to the defendant's acts, had an effect on the value of Rolf's portfolio. Id.
For a discussion of the appropriate measure of damages in aiding and abetting cases, see note
29 infra.
21 For purposes of the appeal, BEDCO conceded vicarious liability under 15 U.S.C. §
78t(a) (1976). 570 F.2d at 48. Thus, the only question presented for review was whether Stott,
its registered agent, could be held liable.
570 F.2d at 44 (citing Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977)). The Hirsch
court assumed without discussion that aiding and abetting is a viable theory of liability under
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 553 F.2d at 759.
" Judges Smith and Oakes constituted the majority of the Roll panel. Judge Mansfield
dissented.
21 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see 570 F.2d at 44; note 9 supra.
570 F.2d at 46-47 n.15 (citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973)
(en banc); Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971)). In support
of his position, Judge Oakes noted that, in reserving the recklessness question, the Hoch/elder
Court cited Lanza and numerous other circuit courts of appeals decisions which acknowl-
edged that reckless disregard for the truth is equivalent to scienter. Id.; see 425 U.S. at 193
n.12. In addition, he pointed to the numerous cases decided since Hochfelder upholding
liability on the basis of recklessness. 570 F.2d at 46 n.14 (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1040, 1043-45 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535
F.2d 982, 993-94 & n.14 (7th Cir. 1976); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp.
818, 825 (E.D. Wis. 1977); McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1060 (D. Del. 1976)).
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ment of specific intent or actual knowledge would impose too great
a burden of proof on the injured party and thereby "disembowel"
the private cause of action." Noting that the existence of a fiduciary
duty presents the most appropriate foundation for the imposition of
liability for reckless conduct, the Second Circuit expressly declined
to determine whether "recklessness satisfies the scienter require-
ments where the alleged aider and abettor owes no duty of disclosure
and of the loyalty to the defrauded party."'
Applying the recklessness standard to the facts, the majority
found that Stott's awareness of the inferior quality of the securities,
his opportunity to supervise the account, and his constant assur-
ances to Rolf made without having investigated and with utter dis-
regard for whether they had a basis in fact, constituted an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care and were therefore
sufficient to sustain liability for aiding and abetting?, Finally,
Judge Oakes concluded that Stott had rendered substantial assis-
tance to Yamada's fraudulent activities by processing orders, giving
repeated assurances, and failing to learn of or disclose the fraud.29
Finally, the Rolf court observed that scienter includes "knowing or intentional" conduct and
that, at common law, "knowing" encompasses reckless disregard. 570 F.2d at 45.
" 570 F.2d at 47.
21 Id. at 44 & n.9.
2 Id. at 47.
2 Id. at 48. Finding that the plaintiff's actual loss was not an overly speculative measure
of damages, the Roll court remanded the case to the district court to determine the difference
between the value of Rolf's portfolio before and immediately after Stott "began to aid and
abet Yamada's fraud." Id. at 49. Rolf's gross economic loss was then to be reduced by the
"average percentage decline in value" of a well-recognized index of stock market value during
the period of Stott's assistance. Id. In addition, the court required the defendants to return
the commissions paid on the issues traded for Rolf during the aiding and abetting period and
requested the district court to reconsider its denial of pre-judgment interest. Id. at 50.
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976) provides that any recovery under § 10(b) is limited to the
amount of "actual damages." While the provision clearly excludes awards for punitive dam-
ages, see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969), it does little to direct the courts to the appropriate measure of "actual damages."
Numerous methods of measuring damages have been suggested. See Mullaney, Theories of
Measuring Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REv. 277, 281-90 (1977). The most common is the "out-of-pocket" theory. Id. at 281; see
Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527,
533 (10th Cir. 1962). The recission measure utilized in Rolf is common in cases where there
is privity or some other special relationship. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-
5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STA. L. Rav. 371 (1974). Damages have also
been measured by the amount it would take to" 'cover' by reinvestment and suffer neither
loss nor forced sale," Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), 405 U.S. 918 (1972), by the plaintiff's total economic loss,
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 305 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y 1969), affl'd, 438 F.2d 1167 (2d
Cir. 1970), and by the plaintiff's out-of-pocket damages plus the profits made by the defen-
dant, Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). Most
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In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mansfield contended that the facts
did not support a finding of liability.30 He noted that-, since Stott
had neither actual knowledge nor constructive notice of Yamada's
unlawful market manipulation, he could not be found to have aided
and abetted Yamada's Rule 10b-5 violations.3 ' Moreover, since
Yamada's investment in unsuitable securities could not itself con-
stitute a violation of Rule 10b-5,3 Stott logically could not be held
liable for the improper management of Rolf's portfolio.3 3 Even as-
suming that liability could be incurred for making unsuitable in-
vestments, Judge Mansfield stated that Stott should not be made
civilly accountable for simply assuring a customer of his advisor's
competence and executing the advisor's buy and sell orders.34 Far
from establishing "recklessness equivalent to deliberate participa-
tion in or aiding and abetting. . . fraud," Stott's omission, in Judge
Mansfield's estimation, constituted at worst a negligent breach of
fiduciary duty.35
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst .& Ernst v.
Hochfelder,31 several courts, including the Second Circuit, approved
the use of a recklessness standard in private damages actions arising
recently, the courts have been receptive to modifications of these traditional measures by
utilizing technical price information, which assures an accurate determination of which losses
were sustained as a result of the defendant's actions. Mullaney, supra, at 288-90.
570 F.2d at 50-56 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 51-52 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
32 Id. at 51 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 51-56 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
n Id. (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield would also have held that NYSE Rule
405 and NASD art. I, § 2 do not give rise to a private cause of action. The courts remain
divided on the question whether the rules and regulations of brokers' associations give rise to
a private cause of action. The Second Circuit has refused to recognize in a private cause of
action based on Article XIV of the New York Stock Exchange Constitution. See Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S 817 (1966). Several
district and state courts have flatly denied any causes of action under such rules. E.g.,
Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn. 1976); Twomey v.
Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (lst Dist. 1968).
But see Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975).
The Seventh Circuit, however, has held that a violation of NYSE Rule 405 or NASD art. I,
§ 2 is actionable. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 963 (1970); cf. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135,
142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969) (damages available when coupled with
sufficient allegations of fraud). While a dispute continues concerning whether the rules were
promulgated for the protection of investors, see, e.g., Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238,
1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970); S. JAFFE, supra note 6, ch. 11.10;
Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM. L. Ray. 12, 29
(1966), it is clear that these rules serve to impose and define the duties of a broker-dealer,
see Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn. 1976).
425 U.S. 185 (1976); see note 9 supra.
19791 SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11 Since that ruling was handed
down, a number of courts3 8 and commentators39 have reconsidered
the issue and again concluded that recklessness satisfies
Hochfelder's scienter requirement."0 Thus, it is somewhat surprising
that in Rolf, the Second Circuit adopted a rather circumspect
stance, expressly leaving open the question whether recklessness
provides an adequate basis for imposing private damages in the
absence of a fiduciary relationship.4
One possible explanation for the court's apparent caution lies
in the peculiar characteristics inherent in the aiding and abetting
theory of liability. Borrowing from common law principles,4" most
31 See, e.g., Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971);
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d
607 (5th Cir. 1974); Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007
(1975); 3 Loss, supra note 3, at 1766 (2d ed. 1961); 6 Loss, supra note 3, at 3884 (Supp. 1969).
See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (Friendly,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
n See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977); Bailey
v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977);
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976); McLean v.
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976). But see SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F.
Supp. 1148 (E.D. Va. 1977).E.g., Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lOb-5:
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 235-36 (1977); Calhoun, Divining the
Implications of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 1 CORP. L. REV. 99, 112-13 (1978); Note,
Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule 10b-5 Actions: Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 925, 936-37 (1977); Note, Recklessness Under Section 10(b): Weathering
the Hochfelder Storm, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 325, 352 (1977).
,1 One commentator has argued that since recklessness is sufficient in common-law fraud
actions, it should also satisfy Rule 10b-5. Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule lOb-
5 Actions: An Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 925, 936-37 (1977).
Another commentator has stated: "[Amny decision, even after Ernst & Ernst, that holds
recklessness insufficient for liability would have to break new ground and develop a theory
disregarding the great weight of applicable authority including many cases and commentaries
favorably cited by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst." Bucklo, supra note 39, at 235-36.
41 Although, prior to Hochfelder, the Second Circuit had clearly disregarded negligence
as a basis of Rule 10b-5 liability, see Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445
(2d Cir. 1971), the court steadfastly regarded recklessness as a satisfactory degree of scienter.
Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). Additionally, the Second
Circuit has concluded that recklessness is a sufficient basis for Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting
liability. See Hirsch v. du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 759 (2d Cir. 1977).
,2 In the early securities cases, the courts used principles derived from criminal law as a
basis for analyzing aiding and abetting liability. See, e.g., SEC v. Time-trust, Inc., 28 F.
Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 142 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1944) (citing 18
U.S.C.A. § 550). Most modern courts, however, have utilized common-law tort principles.
See, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 169 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974);
H.L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Brennan v. Midwest-
ern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968), affl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). See generally Ruder, supra note 5, at 628.
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courts have analyzed aiding and abetting cases in light of three
basic elements.43 The first two elements, the existence of a primary
fraud 4 and knowledge or constructive knowledge of the fraud,45
usually present little analytical difficulty. The third element, how-
ever, that the defendant have rendered substantial assistance to the
illegality, is somewhat problematic. Under a standard that recog-
nizes reckless disregard for the truth as a substitute for actual
knowledge, there is a danger that an individual who has no real
awareness of his role in an illegal scheme will be held liable because
he unwittingly performed some act or omission which futhered it. 6
13 In the leading case, Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702
(N.D. Ind. 1968), affl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), the
court relied principally on Restatement of Torts § 876 (1939), which states in pertinent part:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substan-
tial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and
his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939); accord, SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
" Most courts have concluded that aiding and abetting liability must be predicated upon
an independent violation of the securities laws. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d
84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit,
however, has held that any independent wrong can serve as the basis for aiding and abetting
liability. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
,5 While actual intent or knowledge provide the most reliable foundations for aiding and
abetting liability, see Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975), such strict
theories pose difficult problems of proof. See Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d
442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus, the courts have permitted the use of constructive knowledge
theories, basing liability upon a defendant's demonstrated awareness of material facts. See
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 838 (1969); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Tex.
1971). Even the classic decisions in Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), and Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), often cited for their restrictive character,
recognized that reckless misrepresentations could constitute fraud. In Derry, the court estab-
lished a strict intent requirement for common-law fraud but stated that liability could be
based upon misrepresentations "made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in their truth, or
(3) recklessly, careless whether they be true or false." 14 App. Cas. at 374 (emphasis added).
In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo ruled that, although negligence was not sufficient to establish
common-law fraud, recklessness or a lack of genuine belief in representations made to another
could lead to liability. 255 N.Y. at 186, 174 N.E. at 447-48.
"1 See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975). Even before Hoch-
felder there was some disagreement among the federal courts concerning whether the aiding
and abetting defendant must have knowingly rendered substantial assistance to the fraud.
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits require knowing assistance. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975). While the Third Circuit indicated in an early case that state of mind is irrelevant
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In light of the Hochfelder Court's rejection of unwitting conduct as
a basis for imposing damages under section 10(b),47 it seems clear
that some additional element is necessary to establish that the de-
fendant "knowingly" assisted the primary fraud. In Rolf, the defen-
dant's fiduciary relationship to the trader supplied the missing ele-
ment, since a party with a duty of loyalty and disclosure should be
aware that his own reckless conduct will promote an illegality. Simi-
larly, one who makes misleading statements with reckless disregard
for their truth or falsity may be deemed to have constructive know-
ledge of his role in a fraud if he is aware that another will rely on
his representations." It is questionable, however, whether without
more the Hochfelder rule permits an assessment of damages where
a defendant's mere failure to investigate has the effect of promoting
a fraud.49
The Rolf court's apparent concern for the defendant's aware-
ness of his role in the illegal scheme is particularly noteworthy since,
to the question of substantial assistance, see Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1964), in a subsequent decision, the court appeared to be leaning
towards the position taken by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527
F.2d 880, 886-87 (3d Cir. 1975).
41 See 425 U.S. at 198, 206. A leading commentator has noted that in many cases an
alleged aider and abettor "will merely be engaging in customary business activities, such as
loaning money [and] . . . completing brokerage transactions." Ruder, supra note 5, at 632.
Thus, he concludes, liability must be limited to circumstances evincing other than innocent
or negligent conduct. Id. at 633. Otherwise, the burden on business would be too severe. Id.;
accord, A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 8.5, at 582 (plaintiff must prove actual awareness of
the party's role in the fraudulent scheme). Indeed, the Rolf majority amended its opinion
to emphasize, in part, that the decision should not be read to impose liability upon a broker-
dealer who simply executes orders. See note 49 infra.
" See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Buttrey, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Trussel v. United
Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964); cf. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d
880, 886 (3rd Cir. 1975) (degree of knowledge required varies with the facts of each case). See
generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 8.5, at 582.
o It is interesting to note that two months after the Rolf opinion was handed down, the
majority added the following footnote:
This decision does not impose liability on a broker-dealer who merely executes
orders for "unsuitable" securities made by an investment advisor vested with the
sole discretionary authority to control the account. In the present case, the broker-
dealer, although charged with supervisory authority over the advisor and aware that
the advisor was purchasing "junk," actively lulled the investor by expressing con-
fidence in the advisor without bothering to investigate whether these assurances
were well-founded.
Order supplementing 570 F.2d 38 (May 22, 1978) (adding n.16A).
The seemingly attenuated liability which results when the theories of secondary liability
and liability for reckless conduct are combined is alleviated by the implicit requirement that
a special relationship exist between the plaintiff and defendant. Thus, continued viability of
the aiding and abetting cause of action is assured and compliance with the restrictive spirit
of the Hochfelder decision is achieved.
372 ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:362
prior to Hochfelder, the Second Circuit did not appear to require
that the defendant knowingly render assistance to the wrongdoer's
scheme .5 The holding in Rolf, it is submitted, suggests that the
Second Circuit will be more inclined to examine the relationship
between scienter and the third element of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity in future cases arising under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
William T. Miller
U See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299-1306 (1973) (en banc). But cf. Pettit
v. American Stock Exch. 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (knowing assistance). See also note
46 supra.
